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Abstract
An important problem in networked systems is de-
tection and removal of suspected malicious nodes.
A crucial consideration in such settings is the un-
certainty endemic in detection, coupled with con-
siderations of network connectivity, which im-
pose indirect costs from mistakely removing be-
nign nodes as well as failing to remove malicious
nodes. A recent approach proposed to address
this problem directly tackles these considerations,
but has a significant limitation: it assumes that
the decision maker has accurate knowledge of the
joint maliciousness probability of the nodes on the
network. This is clearly not the case in practice,
where such a distribution is at best an estimate
from limited evidence. To address this problem,
we propose a distributionally robust framework
for optimal node removal. While the problem is
NP-Hard, we propose a principled algorithmic
technique for solving it approximately based on
duality combined with Semidefinite Programming
relaxation. A combination of both theoretical and
empirical analysis, the latter using both synthetic
and real data, provide strong evidence that our
algorithmic approach is highly effective and, in
particular, is significantly more robust than the
state of the art.
1. Introduction
One of the major problems in networked settings is to iden-
tify and remove potentially malicious nodes. For example,
in social networks, malicious nodes may correspond to ac-
counts created by malicious parties which spread social
spam, hate speech, fake news, and the like, with consider-
able deliterious effects (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Cheng
et al., 2015). Major social network platforms consequently
devote considerable efforts to identify and remove fake or
malicious accounts (Rodriguez, 2018; Scott & Isaac, 2017).
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Nevertheless, evidence suggests that the problem remains
pervasive (Andrade, 2018; Narayanan et al., 2018). Simi-
larly, in cyber-physical systems (e.g., smart grid infrastruc-
ture), computing nodes compromised by malware can cause
catastrophic losses, and mitigation through detection and
removal of such malicious nodes is a major problem (Mo
et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2017).
A central challenge faced in deciding which potentially ma-
licious nodes to remove is to account for the combination
of uncertainty about whether particular nodes are malicious,
and the indirect (network) effects of the decision. This com-
bination makes the decision about which nodes to remove
fundamentally a subset selection problem—a challenging
combinatorial optimization problem. Recently, Yu & Vorob-
eychik proposed an approach for solving it they term MINT,
where the problem is captured by approximately minimizing
loss which involves three terms: direct loss from removing
benign nodes, indirect loss from cutting links in the benign
subgraph, and indirect loss from maintaining connectivity
between malicious and benign nodes. This model is il-
Figure 1. An illustration of a decision to remove two nodes, Jack
and Emma, from the network, on our loss function.
lustrated in Fig. 1, where we consider removing Jack and
Emma, two benign nodes above the dotted blue line (and
failing to remove the malicious node). Suppose that we pay
a penalty of α1 for each benign node we remove, a penalty
α2 for each link we cut between benign nodes, and α3 for
each link between remaining malicious nodes and benign
nodes. Since we remove 2 benign nodes, cut 3 links between
benign nodes (one between Emma and Rachel, one between
Emma and Ryan, and another between Jack and Ryan), and
the malicious node is still connected to 2 nodes (Rachel and
Nancy), our total loss is: 2α1 + 3α2 + 2α3.
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A major shortcoming of MINT is that it assumes that the dis-
tribution of node maliciousness is known. In practice, such
a distribution is estimated from limited evidence, such as
node behavior and other characteristics, and this estimation
may be quite inaccurate (particularly if our modeling as-
sumptions are poor, for example, if we erroneously assume
that maliciousness probabilities of nodes are independent).
More precisely, consider an unknown ground-truth P , as
illustrated in Fig. 1 in green. Whereas MINT assumes we
knowP , in reality we only have an estimate Pˆ (shown in red
in Fig. 1). To address this issue, we propose a new approach,
MINT DRO, which is a distributionally robust framework for
optimal node removal. We design an uncertainty set around
the estimate Pˆ and optimize with respect to the worst-case
scenario. We propose a principled algorithmic approach
for solving this problem approximately based on duality
combined with Semidefinite Programming relaxation, and
prove that the uncertainty set in our model contains the
ground-truth distribution P with high probability. This in
turn implies that with high probability MINT DRO is robust
with respect to the ground-truth distribution. Finally, we
conducted extensive experiments using both synthetic and
real data to show that our model is significantly more robust
than MINT.
Related Work There are several prior efforts considering
a related problem of graph scan statistics and hypothesis
testing (Arias-Castro et al., 2011; Priebe et al., 2005; Sharp-
nack et al., 2013). These study the following problem: given
a graphG where each node is associated with a random vari-
able with an exogenously specified probability distribution,
find a subset of nodes that maximizes a scan statistic defined
over subsets of nodes (for example, this statistic may gener-
alize log-likelihood ratio). The recent MINT approach (Yu
& Vorobeychik, 2018) can be viewed through this lens as
well, but as it has been shown to have state-of-the-art perfor-
mance, our comparison, our experimental evaluation focuses
on comparing to MINT.
Also closely related to our problem is the broader literature
on distributionally robust optimization (DRO) (Scarf, 1958).
In the DRO framework one defines a set of probability distri-
butions that is assumed to contain the true stochastic model
of the problem. Many solutions have been proposed to solve
specific problems under the DRO framework (Xu & Mannor,
2010; Calafiore & El Ghaoui, 2006; Yue et al., 2006; Cheng
et al., 2014; Wiesemann et al., 2014), although this frame-
work has not been applied in the context of choosing which
potentially malicious nodes to remove from a network.
Our design of the uncertainty set is inspired by the idea of
moment-constrained uncertainty set (Delage & Ye, 2010;
Popescu, 2007; Calafiore & El Ghaoui, 2006). Yet another
related research strand is in using Semidefinite Program-
ming (SDP) to approximate combinatorial optimization
problems (Goemans & Williamson, 1995; Luo et al., 2010;
Bertsimas & Sethuraman, 2000), although such approaches
are domain specific. Finally, our work bears some relation-
ship to the burgeoning field of adversarial machine learn-
ing (Vorobeychik & Kantarcioglu, 2018), although we do
not explicitly consider issues of adversarial response (such
as evasion attacks) in our setting.
2. Model
We consider a network that is represented by a graph G =
(V,E), where V (|V | = N ) is the set of nodes and E the
set of edges connecting them. Each node i ∈ V represents a
user and each edge (i, j) represents an edge (e.g., friendship
on Facebook) between user i and user j. We focus our
attention on undirected graphs. We denote the adjacency
matrix ofG by A ∈ RN×N . The elements of A are binary if
the graph is unweighted, or some non-negative real numbers
if the graph is weighted. To make expositioin easier we
focus on unweighted graphs. Generalization to weighted
graphs is straightforward.
We consider the problem of removing malicious nodes from
the network G. A configuration of the network is denoted
by pi ∈ {0, 1}N , with pii = 1 indicating that a node i is
malicious, with pii = 0 when i is benign. For convenience,
we also let p¯ii = 1 − pii to indicate that i is benign. Con-
sequently, pi (and pi) assigns malicious or benign label to
each node. The identity of malicious and benign nodes
are usually uncertain. So instead we have a probability
distribution over the configurations. Formally, let pi ∼ P ,
where P captures the joint probability distribution over node
configurations.
Our work builds upon the following model proposed by Yu
& Vorobeychik (2018). Let S denote the set of nodes to
remove. Define a vector x ∈ {−1, 1}N , where xi = 1 if
and only if node i is removed (i ∈ S), and xi = −1 if node
i remains in the network (i ∈ V \ S). The goal of their
model is to identify a subset of nodes S to remove so as to
minimize the impact of the remaining malicious nodes on
the network, while at the same time minimizing disruptions
caused to the benign subnetwork. This goal is naturally
captured by the loss function given in Eq. (1).
L(x) :=
α1
N∑
i=1
xiEpi∼P [p¯ii]︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1
−α2
N∑
i,j
Ai,jxixjEpi∼P [p¯iip¯ij ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
L2
+
α3
N∑
i,j
xixjAi,jEpi∼P [piipij ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
L3
.
(1)
As we can observe, the loss function is composed of three
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components. The first component, L1, of the loss function
is the direct loss associated with removing benign nodes.
The second component, L2, penalizes cutting connections
between benign nodes that are removed and benign nodes
that remain; in other words, it penalizes the degradation of
connectivity within the benign subgraph. The third compo-
nent of the loss function, L3, captures the consequence of
failing to remove malicious nodes in terms of connections
from these to benign nodes. The nonnegative trade-off pa-
rameters α1, α2, and α3 satisfy α1 + α2 + α3 = 1, and
weigh the relative importance of the three components of
the loss function.
The configuration pi is a random variable distributed accord-
ing to P . Let µ ∈ RN and Σ ∈ RN×N denote its mean
and covariance, respectively. The loss function defined in
Eq. (1) depends on both µ and Σ. To make the dependency
explicit we define several matrices and re-write the loss
function in a matrix-vector form. We define the matrices
B(µ),P(µ,Σ),M(µ,Σ) as follow.1
B(µ) : = diag
(
Epi∼P [p¯i]
)
P(µ,Σ) : = A Epi∼P [p¯ip¯iT ]
M(µ,Σ) : = A Epi∼P [pip¯iT ]
Note that the elements of these matrices are not constant,
but depend on µ and Σ (see the appendix for their detailed
dependency).
Slightly abusing notation, we define two additional matrices,
Q(µ,Σ) and b(µ). Note that Q ∈ RN×N is a symmetric
matrix:
Q(µ,Σ) :=(α3/2)
[
M(µ,Σ) + M(µ,Σ)T
]−
(α2/2)
[
P(µ,Σ) + P(µ,Σ)T
]
,
and b(µ) := (α1/2)B(µ)1. We can now rewrite the loss
function in a compact matrix-vector form as the following:
L(x;µ,Σ) = Epi∼P
[
α1L1 + α2L2 + α3L3
]
= xTQ(µ,Σ)x + 2xTb(µ)
Optimizing the loss function above (as done by Yu & Vorob-
eychik) critically assumes that the maliciousness distribution
P is known. In reality, this is typically not the case, and
such a distribution is estimated from data. Let Pˆ denote
the estimated distribution. The mean of Pˆ is denoted by µˆ,
where µˆi is the estimated probability that node i is malicious
given its features from past data. Similarly, the estimated
covariance matrix is represented by Σˆ. The model proposed
by Yu & Vorobeychik is called MINT, which is to solve the
following optimization problem:
min
x
L(x; µˆ, Σˆ)
s.t. x ∈ {−1, 1}N
(MINT)
1diag(x) returns a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements
equal to x.
Although MINT has been shown to perform well on several
real-world datasets, its performance is strongly influenced
by the estimation error of µ. In fact, in Section 5 we show
that even a small estimation error can severely undermine
the performance of MINT.
In order to mitigate the sensitivity of MINT to estimation
error, we propose a novel Distributionally Robust Optimiza-
tion (DRO) approach for solving the problem posed above.
The general idea is to design a distributional set to capture
the uncertainty about the estimated mean µˆ and make deci-
sions considering the worst-case scenario. Specifically, we
propose a model named MINT DRO, which aims to solve
the following optimization problem:
min
x
sup
F∼Π
EF
[L(x;µF , Σˆ)]
s.t. x ∈ {−1, 1}N ,
(MINT DRO)
where the set Π captures uncertainty about the true mean
µ. There are several fundamental differences between
MINT DRO and MINT. First, there is an additional inner
maximization problem in MINT DRO. The inner maximiza-
tion is optimized over a set Π, which contains a set of prob-
ability distributions, where F is any distribution sampled
from Π, and µF are random variables distributed according
to F . Inspired by Delage & Ye (2010) and Cheng et al.
(2014), we parametrize the set Π by the first and second
moments of the distributions in it. Specifically, let F be any
distribution in Π. Consider the following two constraints:
(E[µF ]− µˆ)T Σˆ−1(E[µF ]− µˆ) ≤ γ1
E
[
(µF − µˆ)(µF − µˆ)T
]  γ2Σˆ, (2)
where µˆ and Σˆ are the mean and covariance matrix es-
timated from data. µF are random variables distributed
according to F . The first constraint defines an ellipsoid,
which indicates that the expectation of F lies in the ellip-
soid centered at the estimate µˆ. The size of this ellipsoid
is determined by γ1, which provides a natural measure to
quantify our uncertainty about µ given µˆ. Note that the
second constraint also defines the support of the distribution
F . The second constraint enforces the covariance matrix
of F to lie in a positive semi-definite cone. Intuitively, the
second constraint captures how likely it is that the random
variable µF is close to µˆ. The set Π is then characterized by
Eq. (3):
Π(µˆ, Σˆ,γ1, γ2) :={
F
∣∣∣∣∣ (E[µF ]− µˆ)T Σˆ−1(E[µF ]− µˆ) ≤ γ1E[(µF − µˆ)(µF − µˆ)T ]  γ2Σˆ
}
(3)
The set Π is always non-empty, since it must contain the
distribution Pˆ . In Section 4 we provide probabilistic argu-
ments to show that Π contains ground-truth distribution P
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with high probability, which guarantees that with high prob-
ability our model MINT DRO is robust with respect to the
ground-truth distribution P . The choice of the two parame-
ters γ1 and γ2 is important for the robustness of MINT DRO.
If their values are too small the benefit from the distribu-
tionally robust formulation is limited. In the extreme case
where γ1 and γ2 are zeros our model MINT DRO reverts to
MINT. On the other hand if their values are too large, our
model would make excessively conservative decisions. In
Section 4 we show how to make sensible choice of these
values.
3. Solution Approach
In this section we derive the algorithm to solve our model
MINT DRO. The optimization problem of MINT DRO is a
binary quadratic program, which is diffcult to solve even if
the loss function L(x;µ,Σ) is convex. Additionally, in our
problem the loss function is nonconvex since the matrix Q
is usually not positive (semi)-definite, further complicating
the situation. Indeed, given that MINT, which was shown
by Yu & Vorobeychik to be NP-Hard, is a special case, the
following result is immediate.
Theorem 1. Solving MINT DRO is NP-Hard.
In what follows, we derive an approximation approach for
solving MINT DRO. We first apply duality to transform the
inner maximization into a minimization problem, which can
be jointly minimized with the outer minimization over x. At
this stage the optimization problem is still a NP-hard combi-
natorial optimization problem. Next, we apply Semidefinite
Programming (SDP) to obtain a convex relaxation of our
problem which can be solved efficiently.
The support of the distributions in Π is S, which is defined
as S := {µF ∣∣ (µF − µˆ)T Σˆ−1(µF − µˆ) ≤ γ1}, where the
subscript of µF indexes the distribution associated with this
random variable. Note that µF ∈ S is sufficient for the
first constraint in Eq. (2) to be true, since E[µF ] is a convex
combination of the instantiations of µF and S is a convex
set. We rewrite the inner maximization problem as Eq. (4):
sup
F∼Π
∫
S
[
xTQ(µF , Σˆ)x + 2xTb(µF )
]
dF(µF ) (4a)
s.t.
∫
S
dF(µF ) = 1 (4b)∫
S
[
(µF − µˆ)(µF − µˆ)T
]
dF(µF )  γ2Σˆ (4c)
µF ∈ S,∀µF . (4d)
The constraint Eq.(4b) ensures that F is a valid probability
distribution. The constraints Eq.(4c) guarantee that F is in
Π. The constraint Eq. (4d) ensures that any random variable
µF ∼ F must reside in S. Consequently, this constraint
is actually an infinite dimensional constraint on the opti-
mizer F . Later we introduce a technique called S-Lemma
to convert it to a finite dimensional constraint. We derive
the lagrange function of Eq. (4), where we temporily omit
constraint Eq. (4d), and pull the terms that are independent
of F out of the integral:
l(F , t,K) =
[
t+ Tr
([
γ2Σˆ + µˆµˆ
T
]
K
)]
+∫
S
[
xTQ(µF , Σˆ)x + 2xTb(µF )− t− µTFKµF︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=f(µF )
]
,
where t ∈ R, and K is a real symmetric positive semi-
definite matrix, and Tr(X) returns the trace of the matrix
X. where f(µF ) ≤ 0,∀µF ∈ S holds, since otherwise the
solution to Eq.(4) is unbounded.
By duality (Shapiro, 2001; Delage & Ye, 2010; Cheng et al.,
2014), the dual problem of Eq. (4) is formulated as the
following minimization problem:
min
t,K
t+ Tr
([
γ2Σˆ + µˆµˆ
T
]
K
)
s.t. f(µF ) ≤ 0,∀µF ∈ S
t ∈ R,K ∈ SN+
(5)
where SN+ is the positive semi-definite cone. Strong duality
holds between Eq. (5) and the original inner maximization
problem. This is because for any γ1 > 0 and γ2 > 0, the es-
timated distribution Pˆ is always in the relative interior of Π.
Consequently, by Proposition 3.4 in Shapiro (2001) strong
duality holds. Since Eq. (5) is a minimization problem, we
can jointly minimize it with the outer minimization over x,
which results in the following:
min
x,t,K
t+ Tr
([
γ2Σˆ + µˆµˆ
T
]
K
)
(6a)
s.t. (µF − µˆ)T Σˆ−1(µF − µˆ) ≤ γ1,∀µF ∈ S (6b)
f(µF ) ≤ 0,∀µF ∈ S (6c)
t ∈ R,K ∈ SN+ (6d)
where constraint Eq. (6b) is equivalent to µF ∈ S,∀µF . We
write it this way in order to emphasize its quadratic form.
Constraints Eq.(6b) and (6c) are infinite dimensional con-
straints. We apply a technique called S-Lemma to transform
them to finite dimensional constraints. We first introduce
the S-Lemma:
Lemma 3.1 (S-Lemma (Boyd & Vandenberghe, 2004)). Let
A1,A2 ∈ Sn, b1,b2 ∈ Rn, c1, c2 ∈ R, where Sn is the
subspace of symmetrix matrices in Rn×n. Suppose there
exists an xˆ ∈ Rn such that: xˆTA1xˆ + 2bT1 xˆ + c1 < 0.
Then the following implication holds for any x ∈ Rn:
xTA1x+ 2b
T
1 x+ c1 ≤ 0 =⇒ xTA2x+ 2bT2 x+ c2 ≤ 0
if and only if, ∃λ ≥ 0 :
[
A2 b2
bT2 c2
]
 λ
[
A1 b1
bT1 c1
]
.
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Note that S-Lemma only requires A1 and A2 to be real
symmetric matrices. In order to apply S-Lemma we need
to have two quadratic functions. Constraint Eq. (6b) is a
quadratic function in µF . Thus, what remains is to con-
vert Eq. (6c) to a quadratic function in µF . Recall that the
term, xTQ(µF , Σˆ)x + 2xTb(µF ) in f(µF ), is implicitly
a quadratic function of µF . We re-formulate Q and b ac-
cording to µF , which results in Eq.(7) (see the Appendix
for details about this reformulation):
xTQ(µF , Σˆ)x + 2xTb(µF ) =
µF
[
− (α2 + α3)
(
A (xxT ))]µTF+
µTF
[
(α3 + 2α2)diag(x) ·A · x− α1x
]
−[
α11
Tx− xT
(
(α2 + α3)
(
A Σˆ)+ α2A)x],
(7)
where diag(x) returns a diagonal matrix with diagonal el-
ements equal to x. We substitute Eq. (7) back to f(µF ),
which results in the following equivalence:
∀µF ∈ S : f(µF ) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ µTFRµF + µTFr + z ≤ 0
where:
R = −(α2 + α3)
(
A (xxT ))−K
r = (α3 + 2α2)diag(x) ·A · x− α1x
z = α11
Tx− xT
(
(α2 + α3)
(
A Σˆ)+ α2A)x− t,
which results in a compact form of f(µF ):
f(µF ) = µTFRµF + µ
T
Fr + z
Note that for any γ1 > 0 the inequality in constraint Eq. (6b)
is strict when µF = µˆ. Consequently, by S-Lemma, for any
µF ∈ S the implication,Eq. (6b) =⇒ µTFRµF+µTFr+z,
is equivalent to Eq.(8):
∃λ ≥ 0 :
[
R 12r
1
2r
T z
]
 λ
[
Σˆ−1 −Σˆ−1µˆ
−µˆT Σˆ−1 (µˆT Σˆ−1µˆ− γ1).
]
(8)
The two infinite dimensional constraints Eq.(6b) and (6c)
are thereby converted into a finite dimensional constraint
Eq. (8). Additionally, the objective function in Eq. (6) is
linear in its optimizer.
The last issue is that we still have two sources of non-
convexity in Eq. (6): first, x is binary, and second, the
constraint represented by Eq. (8) is not convex in x because
of three terms involving in R, r and z:
xxT , diag(x)Ax, xT
(
(α2 + α3)(A Σˆ) + α2A
)
x.
(9)
To deal with the first issues, we relax the feasible region of
x to [−1, 1]N . To address the second, we next apply SDP
relaxation to transform Eq. (6) into a convex optimization
problem.
First, let us introduce a matrix X = xxT . Then the follow-
ing three relationships hold (see the Appendix for detailed
proof):
(r1) :
(
A (xxT )) = (AX)
(r2) : diag(x) ·A · x = diag(AX)
(r3) : xT
(
(α2 + α3)(A Σˆ) + α2A
)
x =
(α2 + α3)Tr
(
(A Σˆ)X)+ α2Tr(AX)
(10)
One problem is that the feasible regions involving X and x
are nonconvex because of the equality X = xxT . In order
to transform the feasible regions to be convex, we apply a
two-step relaxation. The first step is to relax the equality
and enforce the diagonal elements of X equal to one, which
results in: X  xxT and Xii = 1,∀i = 1, · · · , N . This
step transforms the feasible region of X to a positive semi-
definite cone, which is a convex set. However, we still have
a nonconvex term xxT . To handle this, in the second step
we apply Schur Complement to transform X  xxT to the
linear matrix inequality:
[
X x
xT 1
]
 0. Combining the
relationships in Eq. (10) with the results of the two-step
relaxation above, the three nonconvex terms in Eq. (9) can
be represented as the following convex set:
Rˆ = −(α2 + α3)
(
AX)−K
rˆ = (2α2 + α3) diag(AX)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗)
−α1x
zˆ = α11
Tx−
(
(α2 + α3)Tr
(
(A Σˆ)X)+ α2Tr(AX))
− t[
X x
xT 1
]
 0,Xii = 1,∀i = 1, · · · , N.
With a slight abuse of notation, the operator diag(AX) in
(∗) extracts the diagonal elements of AX as a column vector.
Finally, by substituting Rˆ, rˆ and zˆ to the corresponding
matrices in Eq. (8) we obtain the following Semidefinite
Program which approximately solves MINT DRO (after we
project the optimal solution x of this problem into {0, 1}N ,
for example, by rounding):
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min
x,X,t,K,λ
t+ Tr
([
γ2Σˆ + µˆµˆ
T
]
K
)
s.t.
[
Rˆ 12 rˆ
1
2 rˆ
T zˆ
]
 λ
[
Σˆ−1 −Σˆ−1µˆ
−µˆT Σˆ−1 (µˆT Σˆ−1µˆ− γ1)
]
[
X x
xT 1
]
 0,Xii = 1,∀i = 1, · · · , N
x ∈ [−1, 1]N , t ∈ R,K ∈ SN+ ,X ∈ SN+ , λ ≥ 0
(11)
4. Theoretical Analysis
In this section we present a probabilistic argument that the
uncertainty set Π defined in Eq. (3) contains the ground-
truth distribution P with high probability. This, in turn,
implies that with high probability our model MINT DRO is
robust with respect to the unknown ground-truth distribution.
We show that the ground-truth distribution P belongs to Π
with high probability in two steps, arguing first that (C1) and,
subsequently, that (C2) below hold with high probability,
where (C1) and (C2) are defined as follows:
(Epi∼P [pi]− µˆ)T Σˆ−1(Epi∼P [pi]− µˆ) ≤ γ1 (C1)
Epi∼P
[
(pi − µˆ)(pi − µˆ)T ]  γ2Σˆ (C2)
The arguments in the first step are based on Lemma 4.1. For
space limitation we defer its proof to the appendix.
Lemma 4.1. Let µ and Σ denote the mean and covariance
matrix of the ground-truth distribution P , and suppose that
µˆ is estimated from M samples, µˆ = 1M
∑M
i=1 ζi, where ζi
is bounded: ‖Σ−1/2(ζi − µ)‖22 ≤ R2,∀i. Then µˆ satisfies
the following constraint with probability at least 1− δ1:
(µ− µˆ)TΣ−1(µ− µˆ) ≤ β(δ),
where β(δ1) = R
2
M
(
2 +
√
2 log 1δ1
)2
.
We assume the estimated covariance matrix Σˆ is close to
Σ. Then, if we let γ1 > β(δ1) and note that µ = Epi∼P [pi],
a direct application of Lemma 4.1 implies that (C1) holds
with probability at least 1− δ1.
The arguments in the second step rely on the result due
to (Delage & Ye, 2010):
Lemma 4.2 (Delage & Ye (2010)). Suppose that ζi is
distributed according to G, and the mean µ of the dis-
tribution is known and used to formulate the estimated
covariance matrix Σˆ, which is estimated from M sam-
ples: Σˆ = (1/M)
∑M
i=1
(
ζi − µ
)(
ζi − µ
)T
, where ζi is
bounded: ‖Σ−1/2(ζi − µ)‖22 ≤ R2,∀i. Then with proba-
bility at least 1− δ2:
Σ  1
1− α(δ2)Σˆ,
where α(δ2) = (R2/
√
M)
(√
1−N/R4 +√log 1/δ2),
M > R4
(√
1−N/R4 +√log 1/δ2)2 and N is the di-
mensions of µ.
In order to use Lemma 4.2 we assume that the estimated
mean µˆ is close to the ground-truth µ. Given this assump-
tion, showing that (C2) holds with high probability is equiv-
alent to show that the following holds with high probability:
Epi∼P [pipiT ]  γ2Σˆ + µµT
by Lemma 4.2, the above is true with high probability when:
1
1−α(δ2)Σˆ  γ2Σˆ + µµT . Consequently, by setting γ2 >
1
1−α(δ2) , such that the effects of µµ
T are negligible, we
conclude that (C2) holds with probability at least 1− δ2.
Finally, by a union bound we obtain probabilistic guarantees
that the uncertainty set Π contains P .
Theorem 2. With probability at least 1 − δ, where δ =
δ1 + δ2, the uncertainty set Π defined in Eq. (3) contains
the ground-truth distribution P .
Proof. The detailed proof is deferred to the appendix.
We now demonstrate how to utilize the probabilistic argu-
ments to make sensible choice for γ1. The value of γ2
can be similarly obtained. Note that γ1 > β(δ1) is neces-
sary for (C1) to hold. Consider a network with N = 128
nodes. Assume Σ is diagonal with diagonal elements equal
to 0.01, which is reasonable when a single estimator is used
to estimate P and the maliciousness probabilities of nodes
are independent. A reasonable estimate of R is
√
128× 2,
which is the radius of the circumcircle sphere of a hypercube
with length of side equal to one. If M = 5 and δ1 = 0.05,
then β(0.05) = 1012. Therefore in order for Π to contain
P with probability ≥ 0.95, we need γ1 ≥ 1012. Similarly,
for a network with N = 500 nodes, we want γ1 ≥ 3956.
5. Experiments
In this section we present experimental results to show the
effectiveness of our approach. Our experiments were con-
ducted on both synthetic and real-world network structures,
although in all cases the distribution P over maliciousness
of nodes was derived using real data. We considered two
types of network generative models to construct synthetic
networks: Barabasi-Albert (BA) (Baraba´si & Albert, 1999)
and Watts-Strogatz networks (Small-World) (Watts & Stro-
gatz, 1998). BA is characterized by its power-law degree
distribution, where the probability that a randomly selected
node has k neighbors is proportional to k−r. For the BA
model we experimented with three variants, BA-1, BA-2, and
BA-3, which differ in the value of the exponent r of their
power-law degree distributions. For Small-World networks
we also experimented with three variants, SW-1, SW-2, and
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SW-3, that have different local clustering coefficients. For
both networks we generated instances with N = 128 nodes.
For real-world networks, we used a network extracted from
Facebook data (Leskovec & Mcauley, 2012) which con-
sisted of 4039 nodes and 88234 edges. We experimented
with randomly sampled sub-networks with N = 500 nodes.
For space limitation the statistics of the networks used in
our experiments are listed in the appendix.
For fair comparison with MINT (the state-of-the-art alterna-
tive), we used the same experimental setup as Yu & Vorob-
eychik (2018). In all of our experiments, we derived the
ground-truth distributionP as follow. We start with a dataset
D which includes malicious and benign instances (the mean-
ing of these designations is domain specific). The dataset
D is partitioned into three subsets: Dtrain, D1 and D2,
with the ratio of 0.3 : 0.6 : 0.1. Our first step is to learn a
probabilistic predictor of maliciousness as a function of a
feature vector x, pˆ(x), on Dtrain. Then we randomly assign
malicious and benign feature vectors from D2 to the nodes
on the network, assigning 10% of nodes with malicious
features and 90% with benign feature vectors. For each
node we use its assigned feature vector x to obtain our esti-
mated probability of this node being malicious, pˆ(x); This
gives us the estimated maliciousness probability distribution
Pˆ . This is the distribution used to solve the model MINT,
and also the distribution used to construct the uncertainty
set Π in our model. To ensure that our evaluation reason-
ably reflects realistic limitations of the knowledge about
the ground-truth distribution P , we train another predictor
p(x) usign Dtrain
⋃
D1. Applying this new predictor to
the nodes and their assigned feature vectors, we obtain a
distribution P∗ which we use to evaluate effectiveness.
We conducted three sets of experiments. In the first set
of experiments we used synthetic networks and used data
from the Spam (Cormack et al., 2008) dataset To simulate
estimation error of P , we add white Gaussian noise to the
evaluation distribution P∗. The standard deviation of the
noise is increased from 0.1 to 0.5 to simulate different mag-
nitudes of the estimation error.
In the second set of experiments we used real-world net-
works from Facebook and used Hate Speech data (Davidson
et al., 2017) collected from Twitter to obtain P as discussed
above. We categorized this dataset into two classes in terms
of whether a tweet represents Hate Speech. After catego-
rization, the total number of tweets is 24783, of which 1430
are Hate Speech. We add white Gaussian noise to P∗ to sim-
ulate estimation error as discussed above. Note that in this
set of experiments we used real data for both the networks
and the maliciousness probabilities P .
In the third set of experiments we considered the scenario
that instead of being random, the location of the malicious
nodes on the network is strategically determined. This sce-
nario is not vacuous: in reality, for example, the nodes that
have high degrees (e.g., celebrities with lots of followers on
Twitter) may be targeted in order to maximize the influence
of commercial advertisements (Kempe et al., 2003). We
conducted this set of experiments on synthetic networks. A
set of nodes is greedily selected from the network to maxi-
mize the number of unique neighbors connecting to them.
Then we assign malicious feature vectors to these nodes.
Experiment Results We compared our model with a
state-of-the-art approach MINT. The average losses for our
first set of experiments where P was simulated from Spam
data are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The experimental results
on BA are showed in Figure 2, with the three columns corre-
sponding to BA-1, BA-2 and BA-3, respectively. The experi-
mental results on Small-World are shown in Figure 3, where
the three columns correspond to SW-1, SW-2, and SW-3. In
both figures, each row corresponds to a combination of trade-
off parameters (α1, α2, α3); for example, (0.2, 0.7, 0.1) cor-
responds to (α1 = 0.2, α2 = 0.7, α3 = 0.1). Each bar was
obtained by averaging over 30 randomly generated network
topologies.
The experimental results indicate that on both BA and Small-
World networks our model MINT DRO is significantly more
robust than MINT. Additionally, when no noise is added to
the evaluation distributionP∗ (left-most bars in all subplots),
MINT DRO is more robust than MINT except for a few cases.
this indicates that the generalization ability of MINT DRO
is better than MINT.
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Figure 2. Experimental results on BA networks. The three columns
correspond to results on BA-1, BA-2 and BA-3, respectively. Top
row: (0.2, 0.7, 0.1); Middle row: (0.7, 0.2, 0.1); Bottom row:
( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
).
The average loss on Facebook data is showed in Figure 4,
with the three columns corresponding to (0.2, 0.7, 0.1),
(0.7, 0.2, 0.1), and ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ). In this experiment, both the
networks and the data used to simulate maliciousness prob-
abilities are real data. Each bar was averaged over 30 ran-
domly sampled networks. Our model MITN DRO is signifi-
cantly more robust than MINT except for the cases where no
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Figure 3. Experimental results on Small-World networks. The
three columns correspond to results on SW-1, SW-2 and SW-3, re-
spectively. Top row: (0.2, 0.7, 0.1); Middle row: (0.7, 0.2, 0.1);
Bottom row: ( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
).
noise is added. In this case, MINT DRO is only worse than
MINT at the left-most bars in the middle figure, although
the difference is not significant. This is actually expected
since MINT DRO considers the worst-case scenario, which
results in a decision that may be slightly conservative in no
noise setting. One observation is that the Facebook networks
used in this experiment are dramatically different from the
simulated networks in terms of graph statistics (see the ap-
pendix for the detailed statistics). Particularly, the Facebook
networks are disconnected, highly sparse, and have approx-
imately 16% nodes that have zero degree. Therefore the
robustness exhibited in Figure 4 provides strong evidence
to the effectiveness of MINT DRO.
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Figure 4. Experimental results on Facebook networks. The
three columns correspond to (0.2, 0.7, 0.1), (0.7, 0.2, 0.1), and
( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
).
The average loss on the third set of experiments are shown
in Figures 5 and 6 for BA and Small-World networks, re-
spectively. For both figures the three columns correspond
to (0.2, 0.7, 0.1), (0.7, 0.2, 0.1), and ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ). The results
show that MINT DRO is more robust than MINT across
all settings. Recall that the loss function of MINT and
MINT DRO depends on the estimated covariance matrix Σˆ,
which encodes correlation information of the distribution
Pˆ . When the actual maliciousness of nodes become corre-
lated as we simulated in this experiment, the performance of
MINT degrades since it is using the estimated distribution
Pˆ which now significantly deviates from the true distribu-
tion. When γ1 and γ2 are appropriately selected, Π contains
the distribution that characterizes the strategic correlation
simulated in this experiment, resulting in significantly better
robustness.
One may argue that instead of resulting from the robust-
ness against correlation in the maliciousness distribution
that comes from strategic decision about where to place
the malicious nodes, the robustness exhibited in Figures 5
and 6 stems solely from the fact that MINT DRO is more
robust than MINT when no noise is added to P∗. However,
consider the left-most bars in the lower-left subplot of Fig-
ure 2. In this setting MINT DRO performs worse than MINT.
Now, consider another setting where the experimetal setup
is identical except that the malicious nodes are strategically
chosen. This setting corresponds to the left-most bars in the
right subplot of Figure 5 where MINT DRO performs better
than MINT. Similar observations can be found on Small-
World networks. Consequently, we can see that a major
advantage of MINT DRO is in its robustness even when the
location of the malicious nodes on the graph is itself chosen
strategically.
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Figure 5. Experimental results on the robustness to strategic se-
lection of malicious nodes on BA networks. Left: (0.2, 0.7, 0.1);
Middle: (0.7, 0.2, 0.1); Right: ( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
).
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Figure 6. Experimental results on the robustness to strategic se-
lection of malicious nodes on Small-World networks. Left:
(0.2, 0.7, 0.1); Middle: (0.7, 0.2, 0.1); Right: ( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
6. Conclusion
We considered the problem of removing malicious nodes
from a network under uncertainty. We designed a model
that considers the uncertainty around the estimated mali-
ciousness probabilities, and makes decision under the worst-
case scenario. We then proposed a principled algorithmic
technique for solving it approximately based on duality
combined with Semidefinite Programming relaxation. We
theoretically proved that our model is robust with respect to
the ground-truth, and experimentally showed that our model
is more robust than the state of the art.
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Appendix
1. Proof of Lemma 4.1
The proof is a generalization of a result proved by Shawe-Taylor & Cristianini. For completeness we list their result in
Lemma 1.1.
Lemma 1.1. (Shawe-Taylor & Cristianini, 2003)
Assume ζ ∈ RN is a random variable satisfying:
E[ζ] = 0
E[ζζT ] = I
‖ζ‖22 ≤ R2,
where the last inequality bounds the support of ζ . Let {ζi}Mi=1 be a set of M independently and ramdomly sampled instances
of ζ. Then with probability at least (1− δ), the following inequality holds:∥∥∥∥∥ 1M
M∑
i=1
ζi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ R
2
M
(
2 +
√
2 log
1
δ
)2
In what follows we prove Lemma 4.1:
Lemma 4.1. Let µ and Σ denote the mean and covariance matrix of the ground-truth distribution P , and suppose that
µˆ is estimated from M samples, µˆ = 1M
∑M
i=1 ζi, where ζi is bounded: ‖Σ−1/2(ζi − µ)‖
2
2 ≤ R2,∀i. Then µˆ satisfies the
following constraint with probability at least 1− δ1:
(µ− µˆ)TΣ−1(µ− µˆ) ≤ β(δ),
where β(δ1) = R
2
M
(
2 +
√
2 log 1δ1
)2
.
Proof. Apply a standadization to the ζi, which results in a new random variable γi := Σ−1/2(ζi − µ). It is clear that γi
satisfies Lemma 1.1. Let β(δ1) = R
2
M
(
2 +
√
2 log 1δ1
)2
, then we have:
P
(
(µˆ− µ)TΣ−1(µˆ− µ) ≤ β(δ1)
)
= P
(∥∥∥∥Σ−1/2(µˆ− µ)∥∥∥∥2
2
≤ β(δ1)
)
= P
(∥∥∥∥∥Σ−1/2
(
1
M
M∑
i=1
ζi − µ
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≤ β(δ1)
)
= P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1M
M∑
i=1
Σ−1/2
(
ζi − µ
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≤ β(δ1)
)
= P
(
1
M
∥∥∥∥∥
M∑
i=1
γi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≤ β(δ1)
)
≥ 1− δ1
2. Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. With probability at least 1− δ, where δ = δ1 + δ2, the uncertainty set Π contains the ground-truth distribution
P .
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Proof. We define two events A1 and A2 as follow:
A1 : (C1) holds given Σˆ is close to Σ
A2 : (C2) holds given µˆ is close to µ
Then we have:
P
(
A1 ∩A2
)
= P
(
(Ac1 ∪Ac2)c
)
1− P(Ac1 ∪Ac2)
(by union bound)
≥ 1− [P(Ac1)+ P(Ac1)]
≥ 1− [δ1 + δ2]
= 1− δ,
where A1 ∩A2 is the event that P ∈ Π. In other words, P
(P ∈ Π) ≥ 1− δ, which completes the proof.
3. Detailed dependency of B(µ),P(µ,Σ),M(µ,Σ) on their arguments
In the following we expand the definition of B(µ),P(µ,Σ),M(µ,Σ), which makes their dependency on µ and Σ clear:
B(µ) : = diag
(
Epi∼P [p¯i]
)
= diag
(
1− µ)
P(µ,Σ) : = A Epi∼P [p¯ip¯iT ]
= A
(
J(N,N)− J(N, 1)× µT − µ× J(1, N) + Σ + µ× µT
)
M(µ,Σ) : = A Epi∼P [pip¯iT ]
= A
(
µ× J(1, N)−Σ− µ× µT
)
4. Detailed forms of the matrices Q(µ,Σ) and b(µ)
The matrices Q(µ,Σ) and b(µ) defined in the paper have the following forms:
Q(µ,Σ) : =
α3
(
M(µ,Σ) + M(µ,Σ)T
)
2
−
α2
(
P(µ,Σ) + P(µ,Σ)T
)
2
= α3A
[
µ1T + 1µT
2
−Σ− µµT
]
− α2A
[
J(N,N)− 1µT − µ1T + Σ + µµT
]
= A
[(
α3 + 2α2
2
)
µ× 1T +
(
α3 + 2α2
2
)
1× µT − (α2 + α3)Σ− (α2 + α3)µ× µT − α2J(N,N)
]
= A
[(
α3 + 2α2
2
)
(µ− 1)× 1T +
(
α3 + 2α2
2
)
1× (µ− 1)T + (α2 + α3)J(N,N)
− (α2 + α3)Σ− (α2 + α3)µ× µT
]
b(µ) : = (α1/2)B(µ)1
= (α1/2)(1− µ)
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5. Detailed reformulation of Eq. (7)
In the paper in order to apply the S-Lemma to convert the two infinite dimensional constraints, Eq. (6b) and Eq. (6c), to a
finite dimensional constraint, we need two functions in quadratic forms. Notice that Eq. (6b) is already a quadratic function
in µF . So what remains is to convert Eq. (6c) to a quadratic function in µF . We first convert the following to a quadratic
function in µF :
xTQ(µF , Σˆ)x + 2xTb(µF )
From last section we know:
Q(µF , Σˆ) =
(
α3 + 2α2
2
)[
A
(
(µF − 1)× 1T
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+
(
α3 + 2α2
2
)[
A
(
1× (µF − 1)T
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
+
(α2 + α3)A− (α2 + α3)
(
A Σˆ)− (α2 + α3)A (µF × µTF)︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
(12)
The three terms 1 , 2 and 3 , together with x, form three quadratic functions in x. In what follows, we convert them to
quadratic functions in µF . Note that the operator diag(x) returns a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements equal to x:
xT
[
A
(
1× (µF − 1)T
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
x
(∗)
= Tr
[
diag(x) ·A · diag(x) · (µF − 1)× 1T
]
=
(the trace operator is invariant under cyclic permutations)
= Tr
[
A · diag(x) · (µF − 1)× 1T · diag(x)
]
= Tr
[
A · diag(x) · (µF − 1) · xT
]
(
Tr
[
A · diag(x) · 1 · xT ] = Tr[AxxT ] = xTAx)
= Tr
[
A · diag(x) · µF · xT
]
− xTAx(
diag(x)µF = diag(µF )x
)
= Tr
[
A · diag(µF ) · xxT
]
− xTAx
= xT
[
A · diag(x)
]
µF − xTAx
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where (∗) comes from the fact that xT [AB]x = Tr[diag(x) ·A · diag(x) ·BT ]. Similarly we have:
xT
[
A
(
(µF − 1)× 1T
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
x = Tr
[
diag(x) ·A · diag(x)× 1× (µF − 1)T
]
= Tr
[
diag(x) ·A · x · (µF − 1)T
]
= Tr
[
diag(x) ·A · x · µF
]
− xTAx
= xT
[
A · diag(x)
]
µF − xTAx
and:
xT
[
(α2 + α3)A− (α2 + α3)
(
A Σˆ)− (α2 + α3)A (µFµTF)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
x =
(α2 + α3)x
TAx− (α2 + α3)xT
(
A Σˆ)x− (α2 + α3)µTF(A (xxT ))µF︸ ︷︷ ︸
()
,
where () comes from the following:
− (α2 + α3)xT
[
A (µFµTF)]x
= −(α2 + α3)Tr
[
diag(x) ·A · diag(x) ·
(
µFµTF
)]
= −(α2 + α3)Tr
[
diag(x) ·A · diag(µF ) · x · µTF
]
= −(α2 + α3)Tr
[
A · diag(µF ) · x · µTF · diag(x)
]
= −(α2 + α3)Tr
[
A · diag(µF ) · xxT · diag(µF )
]
= −(α2 + α3)Tr
[
diag(µF ) · xxT · diag(µF ) ·A
]
= −(α2 + α3)µTF
(
A (xxT ))µF
Putting the above derivation together we obtain:
xTQ(µF , Σˆ)x + 2xTb(µF ) =
µTF
[
− (α2 + α3)
(
A (xxT ))]µF + µTF
[
(α3 + 2α2)diag(x) ·A · x− α1x
]
−[
α11
Tx− xT
(
(α2 + α3)
(
A Σˆ)+ α2A)x]
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So the function f(µF ) becomes:
xTQ(µF , Σˆ)x + 2xTb(µF )− t− µTFKµF =
µTF
[
− (α2 + α3)
(
A (xxT ))−K]µF + µTF
[
(α3 + 2α2)diag(x) ·A · x− α1x
]
+[
α11
Tx− xT
(
(α2 + α3)
(
A Σˆ)+ α2A)x− t],
which is a quadratic function in µF . Define R, r and z as the following:
R = −(α2 + α3)
(
A (xxT ))−K
r = (α3 + 2α2)diag(x) ·A · x− α1x
z = α11
Tx− xT
(
(α2 + α3)
(
A Σˆ)+ α2A)x− t,
which results in a compact form of f(µF ):
f(µF ) = µTFRµF + µ
T
Fr + z
6. Proof of Eq.(10) in the paper
The relation (r1) is direct. To see why (r2) holds, note that the i-th element of diag(x) ·A · x is:
[
diag(x) ·A · x
]
i
= xi
N∑
j=1
Aijxj ,
which is equal to the i-th element of diag(AX):
[
diag(AX)
]
i
=
[
diag(A)xxT
]
i
= xi
N∑
j=1
Aijxj .
The relation (r3) holds because:
xT
(
(α2 + α3)(A Σˆ) + α2A
)
x = (α2 + α3)x
T (A Σˆ)x + α2xTAx
= (α2 + α3)Tr
[
(A Σˆ)xxT
]
+ α2Tr
[
AxxT
]
= (α2 + α3)Tr
[
(A Σˆ)X
]
+ α2Tr
[
AX
]
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7. Statistics of the networks used in experiments
r density #edges clustering coeff.
BA-1 2.7167 0.0461 375 0.1340
BA-2 2.2789 0.0610 496 0.1504
BA-3 2.0374 0.0757 615 0.1646
SW-1 0.0787 640 0.3664
SW-2 0.1102 896 0.3875
SW-3 0.1575 1280 0.4059
Facebook 0.0106 1325 0.3930
Table 1. Statistics of networks used in our experiments. r is the exponent of the power-law degree distribution.
